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WILLIAM F. VOELKER*
W HEN corporation X proposes to acquire corporation Y in a
form of tax-free reorganization, it is safe to assume that the
tax implications of the transaction have been considered thoroughly,
particularly as they affect stockholders of the corporation to be
acquired. The securities ramifications of the transaction generally
receive more superficial consideration, however, even though the
choice of the form of reorganization can profoundly affect stock-
holders of the acquired corporation. This article will examine the
status under the Securities Act of 19331 (Securities Act) of the stock-
holder of a corporation the control or assets of which are acquired
in a tax-free reorganization. From the standpoint of the tax laws,
the common methods of acquiring corporate control are the "A,"
the "B," and the "C" reorganizations; that is to say, the statutory
merger, the exchange of stock, and the acquisition of assets for stock,
sometimes termed a quasi-merger or practical merger.2 "D," "E,"
and "'F" reorganizations, which involve spin-offs, recapitalizations
and reincorporations, also are affected by the securities laws. How-
ever, since these reorganizations involve changes in the form or capi-
tal structure of a single corporate entity rather than the acquisition
of one business by another, they are beyond the scope of this article.
* A.B. 1942, LL.B. 1948, Columbia University. Member, Colorado Bar.
148 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77b-h (Supp. V, 1964).
2The designations "A," "B," and "C" represent terminology derived from the tax
laws, not the securities laws. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368 (a) (1). Moreover, as
will be seen below, certain of these reorganizations may be exempted from registra-
tion under the Securities Act, even though for certain technical reasons they may
not comply with the tax-free reorganization requirements of the Internal Revenue
Code.
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THE: "B" REORGANIZATION
A "B", reorganization is tax free both to the participating cor-
porations and to the stockholders of the acquired corporation if the
acquiring corporation, in exchange solely for shares of its own voting
stock, or for shares of voting stock of a corporation which controls
the acquiring corporation, acquires from the stockholders of the
acquired corporation at least eighty percent of the outstanding
shares of voting stock of the acquired corporation and eighty per-
cent of the shares of all other classes.3 The acquiring corporation
obtains several advantages from employing this method-the busi-
ness to be acquired is received as a unit; its contingent liabilities, if
any; are insulated from the parent; and the corporate procedures
involved are far less complicated than those required under a merger
or asset acquisition.
From the standpoint of the securities laws, however, the acquir-
ing corporation is in precisely the same situation as if it were offer-
ing shares of its capital stock to the stockholders of the acquired
corporation for cash. Consequently, in the absence of an exemption,
this offering must be registered under the Securities Act. If the
number of stockholders of the acquired corporation is relatively
small, it may be possible for the acquiring corporation to rely upon
the so-called private placement exemption, assuming, of course, that
the stockholders are willing to take their stock for investment pur-
poses. For its own protection the acquiring corporation will prob-
ably wish to police this investment representation. This is common-
ly accomplished by placing an investment stop in the files of the
transfer agent, by causing the certificates themselves to be stamped
with a legend indicating that they were issued in reliance upon the
exemption contained in section 4 (2) of the Securities Act, and by
requiring the stockholders of the acquired corporation to agree con-
tractually that prior to the expiration of a specified period of time,
say two years, the company and the transfer agent be furnished
with an opinion of reputable counsel regarding any proposed trans-
SINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 368 (a)(1)(B), (c). The latter 80% requirement has
been interpreted to mean 80% of the shares of each of such other classes, not merely
80% of the total number of non-voting shares. Rev. Rul. 259, 1959-2 CuM. BuLL.
115. Under the Revenue Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 19 (1964), voting shares of a corpora-
tion controlling the acquiring corporation may be given in exchange for stock of
the acquired corporation. Revenue Act of 1964, § 218, 78 Stat. 57 (1964). This
change conforms to the scheme of the "C" reorganization.
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fer to the effect that such transfer will not violate the original in-
vestment intent expressed by the stockholder.4
The holding period of two years mentioned above is somewhat
arbitrary. As may be imagined, there has been much speculation
as to what constitutes a safe "holding period" in order to demon-
strate that the purchaser of securities in a private placement had
the requisite "investment intent."5 The Securities and Exchange
Commission (Commission) has never conceded that the passage of
any minimum "holding period" will ever guarantee or conclusively
demonstrate investment intent, but rather has stated that original
investment intent will be determined by all the "facts and circum-
stances" surrounding the original acquisition and a proposed dis-
position.6 Indeed, acquiring with the intention of holding for a
specified period of time and then disposing of the securities is not
purchasing with an investment intent at all. From a practical stand-
point, however, certain guidelines have been established for pur-
poses of determining when securities originally taken for investment
may be disposed of safely. Thus the phrase "holding period" has
become firmly established in the argot of securities lawyers, and the
concept embodied thereby has become as important as is the capital
gains holding period to a tax lawyer. During the early years of
the Securities Act, it was generally assumed that a holding period
of one year would be sufficient to demonstrate investment intent.7
The thirteen-month period was a frequently used talisman.8 More
recently, a period of two years has come to be accepted as a rule
of thumb; this is the period of time during which the Commission
has required that an S-14 registration statement be supplemented. 9
It may be that the stockholders of the acquired corporation will
not be willing to accept stock of the acquiring corporation subject
' Contracts with stockholders of the acquired corporation must be carefully worded
so as to indicate that their purpose is merely to assist in policing, and that there
is no implication that the stockholders are taking with the intention of selling upon
expiration of the specified period. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552, Nov. 6,
1962.
rSee Garrett, Federal Securities Act-An Introduction to Jurisdiction, 5 Co"P.
PRAC. COMM. 16, 36-46 (1963).
0 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552, Nov. 6, 1962.
See SEC Securities Act Release No. 285, Jan. 24, 1935. (Opinion of General
Counsel.)
8 While this period had no statutory basis as such, it was derived from the old
thirteen-month prospectus period, that is, the period (prior to the 1954 amendments)
after which a prospectus became stale.
0 See text accompanying note 37 infra.
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to investment restrictions. Although they may have no present de-
sire to dispose of the shares of the acquiring corporation within
the immediate .future, by the same token they may be unwilling
to represent that they are taking the stock for investment purposes.
They may insist upon "fully registered" stock, meaning stock which
will be disposable by them at any time. This will leave them free
to make immediate sales whenever disposition is dictated by general
market conditions or personal circumstances.
Unfortunately, this course of action is not easily implemented.
First, contrary to a prevalent misconception among laymen and even
some segments of the legal profession, it is not possible to register
stock in the abstract. Registration can only be accomplished in con-
nection with a presently contemplated bona fide public offering of
stock; with certain exceptions, there can be no registration of securi-
ties for the "shelf." Even if an acquiring corporation went through
the effort of registering stock offered to a small number of stock-
holders of a closely-held acquired corporation, such stockholders
would not receive freely disposable stock. The Commission would
not regard such an offering as a bona fide public distribution of
securities. 10 Thus, even though he might receive registered stock,
each stockholder would be considered a statutory underwriter and
would be required to deliver a current prospectus to each person
purchasing from him in a subsequent resale, regardless of the amount
of time having elapsed since his acquisition of the stock.
In order for the stockholders of a closely-held acquired corpora-
tion to receive shares which are freely alienable, a bona fide secon-
dary distribution of the shares by the stockholders would have to be
.effected immediately following the exchange offering. Such a dis-
tribution could take either of two forms. It might consist of a fully
syndicated offering by an underwriting group at a set price, thereby
effecting the requisite public distribution. In the alternative, if the
stockholders are willing to commit themselves to a disposition of
the shares over an extended period of time, the proposed method of
offering could consist of a series of sales on an exchange or in the
2 'A similar problem is presented when substantial purchasers in a "private"
transaction wish fully registered stock, and the issuer is willing to comply.
In these instances there is a curious reVersal of contentions. Counsel for the issuer
would argue that the issue is a public offering, since the purchasers are unwilling to
take for investment. The Commission, on the other hand, would argue that the
offering is private, or at least nonpublic, even though the purchasers may be
statutory underwriters if they reselli
[Vol. 1965: 1
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over-the-counter market, through the medium of broker-dealers, up-
on the basis of a formula price described in the prospectus. The latter
method not only exposes the stockholders to the risks of a declining
market, but is subject to legal intricacies under the securities laws,
particularly the anti-manipulation provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 193411 (Exchange Act). The dangers of a haphazard,
sporadic distribution of shares by a number of stockholders were
adverted to in the Hazel Bishop decision, 2 wherein the Com-
mission stop-ordered a registration statement pursuant to which such
distributions were being made. After discussing a number of mis-
representations comprising the basis of the stop order, the Commis-
sion went on to observe that during a prolonged distribution there
was the possibility, and even the probability, of illegal market manip-
ulation, however inadvertent, by or on behalf of selling stockholders
and brokers effecting the distribution. Moreover, if bids for, or pur-
chases of, a security of the same class were being made by or on be-
half of any selling stockholder, or by the issuer or any dealer or
broker participating in any of such sales, there would have been a
violation of rule 10 (b) (6) under the Exchange Act.
The Commission has since evolved requirements for such offer-
ings designed to avoid such violations. The selling stockholders
must advise broker-dealers selected to execute their sale orders that
such broker-dealers must not have made solicited purchases of the
stock for a period of ten business days prior to the time of acceptance
of the sell order; otherwise such broker cannot handle the order.
The broker itself must acknowledge that it has not engaged in any
purchases of the stock during the proscribed period. Moreover,
letters and other written material in aid of such an offering must
be preceded by a statutory prospectus, and compliance with rule 153
of the Securities Act (under which prospectuses are made available
at the trading post on the exchange) will not fulfill this requirement.
These factors indicate that the syndicated offering is the most de-
sirable method of secondary distribution, despite the fact that under-
writing commissions will normally exceed brokerage commissions.
The choice'13 of the stockholder regarding the method to be
1148 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to hh-1 (1958), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78c-s (Supp. V, 1964).
12 Hazel Bishop, Inc., 40 S.E.C. 718 (1961).
18 The discussion in this paragraph is relevant only where the value of the stock
received exceeds the tax basis of the shares of the acquired corporation. Where a
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utilized in effecting a secondary distribution is further complicated
by the policy of the Internal Revenue Service that the disposition
of over fifty percent of the stock received in an otherwise tax-free
"B" reorganization will nullify the tax-free character of the reorgani-
zation. In such a case the Service will view the reorganization as
failing to meet the test of business continuity. This test is apparent-
ly applied to the holdings of all stockholders participating in the
exchange, so that the actions of other stockholders may deprive a
particular stockholder of tax-free treatment even though he retains
over fifty percent of the stock which he receives. While subsequent
unrelated sales of the acquiring corporation's stock, even in excess
of fifty percent, might not result in retroactive disqualification, it
could hardly be argued that the filing of a substantially concurrent
registration statement by the acquiring corporation did not consti-
tute a pre-arranged plan of disposition. If the stockholder decides
to register all the stock in a syndicated offering, which is promptly
distributed, there is no problem, since the stockholder will have
the money with which to pay the tax. On the other hand, if he
elects to dispose of over fifty percent of the stock in a series of bro-
kerage transactions at the market, it is conceivable that he might
have to pay the tax before receiving the proceeds of the sales, or
that the value of the stock when sold may be less than its value
on the date of the exchange, the latter being determinative for tax
purposes.
A further tax problem arising in connection with a "B" reorgani-
zation and the registration of stock received pursuant thereto is the
requirement that the stockholder receive solely voting stock of the
acquiring corporation or a corporation in control of the acquiring
corporation. Any other consideration is regarded as "boot," which
invalidates the entire tax-free character of the exchange.14 "Boot"
is not confined to cash, and may take the form of any other thing
of value, such as property or promises to pay additional considera-
tion in the future. Is an agreement by the acquiring corporation
to register the stock, whether immediately upon consummation of
the transaction or at some time in the future at the request of the
stockholder, considered "boot"? The better view is that it would
not be so considered. Suppose, however, that coupled with an agree-
loss is involved, the stockholder will ordinarily wish to avoid a "B" reorganization
so as to recognize the loss.
14 Turnbow v. Commissioner, 568 U.S. 337 (1961).
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ment to register is an agreement to pay the expenses of the registra-
tion and of the offering. Here the determining factor would
be whether the acquiring corporation, in paying the registration
and offering expenses, is discharging an obligation of its own or that
of the stockholder. If the corporation permits the distribution of
the shares without filing a registration statement, it will be in vio-
lation of the registration requirements of the Securities Act. More-
over, only an issuer can file a registration statement. Thus, since
the corporation has a legal obligation to file a registration state-
ment, it would not be paying the registration expenses to discharge
a legal obligation of the stockholder, even though the stockholder
must have the benefit of the registration statement in order to make
a legal distribution of his shares. Registration expenses would in-
clude accounting fees, the issuer's legal fees, registration and Blue
Sky fees, and printing costs. Other expenses which properly may be
borne by the acquiring corporation include federal and state original
issue taxes. On the other hand, it seems clear that the stockholders
of the acquired corporation should pay underwriting commissions
and discounts, finders fees, transfer taxes upon the transfer of their
shares to the acquiring corporation, and fees of their own legal
counsel in connection with the transaction; any attempt to shift such
expenses to the acquiring corporation will give rise to "boot" and
is to be avoided at all costs.15
If the acquired corporation has a relatively large number of
stockholders the acquiring corporation cannot safely proceed to offer
its shares on the basis of the private placement exemption. In close
cases a corporation may seek a "no-action" letter from the Com-
mission to the effect that if the facts are as represented, no adminis-
trative action will be taken against the issuer if an offering is
consummated on a private placement basis. If this is not possible,
a registration statement must be filed and the offering made to the
stockholders of the corporation to be acquired. The registration
; Treatment of premiums for insurance policies providing indemnification against
Securities Act liabilities is troublesome. Such policies insure issuer, underwriter and
if desired, selling stockholders. If the premium is a blanket one, no allocation or
assumption by selling stockholders may be required; on the other hand, where sell-
ing stockholder coverage requires a separate premium, its payment by the issuer
may be unwise.
The Commission formerly denied acceleration of registration statements for secon-
dary offerings where selling stockholders did not pay their share of the expenses. This
policy has now been rescinded.
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statement involved will be particularly complex, since the prospectus
must set forth information pertaining not only to the acquiring
corporation but also to the corporation to be acquired. This is
necessary in order to enable the stockholders to evaluate what they
are surrendering as well as what they are. getting. Quite obviously,
such an exchange offering should have the cooperation, or at least
the benevolent neutrality, of the management of the corporation
which is being acquired.16
Assuming that the acquiring corporation encounters a coopera-
tive management, its negotiators must approach certain controlling
stockholders of the corporation to be acquired in order to solicit
their cooperation and receive assurances that at least the minimum
percentage of shares will be available at the outset of the offering.
Are not these approaches unlawful as constituting the initial step
of a general solicitation to all shareholders? The Commission in
this case regards the controlling stockholders of the prospective ac-
quired corporation as underwriters, thus permitting such discussions
to fall within the exemption contained in section 2 (3) of the Securi-
ties Act.-T Having been regarded as underwriters for this purpose,
however, such individuals become underwriters for other purposes.
For example, even though the shares offered to the stockholders of
the acquired corporation are registered, any stockholder who has
been classified as an underwriter will be unable to resell his shares
unless the terms of his reoffering are set forth in the prospectus
and he proposes to reoffer the shares immediately. 8 If he has no
immediate intention of reselling the shares received in the reorgani-
zation, then such shares may have to be reregistered prior to their
disposition, or at least resold with a section 10 (a) (3) prospectus.'9
" There have been instances where a corporation sought to obtain control of
a second corporation against the wishes of the management of the corporation to
be acquired. In such a case, information concerning the acquired corporation may
be difficult to obtain and may have to be confined to published information, assum-
ing that the acquired corporation is sufficiently large to be described in financial
manuals or to have filed reports with the Commission under any of the several
applicable acts. Moreover, the management of the corporation to be acquired, in
addition to circularizing stockholders in opposition, can devise many roadblocks,
such as stock splits and dividends, which will upset the exchange ratios.
2768 Stat. 683 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (3) (1958). That section excludes from
the definition of sale and offer to sell, "preliminary negotiations or agreements be-
tween an issuer.., and any underwriter .... "
28 A stockholder who has not been classified as an underwriter may resell at any
time, without being subject to such restrictions,
29 That is, a prospectus containing current information concerning the company as
[Vol. 1965: 1
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Of course, if the individual holds the shares for a sufficient period
of time it will be presumed that he did not take with a view to
distribution, and he then will be free to dispose of the shares upon
the same basis as any other stockholder.
Controlling stockholders of the acquired corporation should, if
possible, require the acquiring corporation to agree that it will
register their shares in a secondary offering upon their request at
any time within one or two years from the date of the tax-free ex-
change. It is also customary for the acquiring corporation to give
such stockholders so-called "tag along" rights to have their stock
registered in the event that the corporation for any reason files a
registration statement for an 'offering of its stock; such rights are
normally effective for a period of three years from the date of the
tax-free exchange. In these cases it is not clear whether the payment
of registration expenses by the acquiring corporation would consti-
tute "boot" and retroactively disqualify the original reorganization
from its tax-free status. It is true, of course, that registration of the
shares, even under these circumstances, serves to protect the acquir-
ing corporation from the claim that it has violated the Securities
Act by issuing shares to a person taking with a view to distribution,
thus justifying payment of the expenses by the corporation in order
to satisfy its own legal obligations. The Service has informally
agreed that "boot" does not exist where the acquiring corporation
has already registered its outstanding voting shares of the same class
(either wholly or in part), so that registration of the new shares
merely gives them the same status as that of the outstanding shares.
But where no outstanding shares of the acquiring corporation have
been registered (for example, where publicly held stock was out-
standing prior to 1933), the situation becomes questionable.2 0 The
safer course of action for the stockholder is to pay his proportionate
share of the overall registration expense for the offering.
21
required by § 10 (a) (3) of the Securities Act. 68 Stat. 685 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77j (c)
(1958).
20 BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No. 78, pp. A-7, A-8. The BNA analysis
suggests that in such cases the issuer's "commitment" to register all outstanding stock
is required. This overlooks the fact that it usually is not possible to register out-
standing, publicly held stock retroactively.
2If the proposed distribution and payment of registration expenses occurs more
than three years after the tax-free acquisition, it is possible that the applicable
tax limitation periods will have expired. But in that case, assuming that no pre-
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RULE 133 TRANSACTIONS-"A" AND "C" REORGANIZATIONS
If the acquiring corporation wishes to avoid registration state-
ment problems, it may have available two other reorganizational
choices, the statutory merger and the quasi, or practical, merger.22
Of course, in order for the corporation to avail itself of these meth-
ods, such procedures must be possible under the corporate laws of
the states of incorporation. Under the statutory merger procedure,
stockholder votes will be required on the part of both corporations,
with concomitant rights of appraisal for dissenters; under the practi-
cal merger, a stockholder vote ordinarily will be necessary only in the
corporation to be acquired.23 Under both statutory and practical
mergers the issuing of shares pursuant to a proposal which has been
submitted to a vote of the stockholders is not considered a sale for
purposes of the registration requirement of the Securities Act 24 by
reason of the provisions of rule 133.25 Rule 133 exempts not only
the issuance of the shares by the surviving corporation to the ac-
quired corporation, but also the subsequent distribution of the
shares by the latter corporation to its stockholders in dissolution.
Much has been written about the propriety or advisability of the
adoption of this rule, and it is not the purpose of this article to
review the arguments. The Commission adopted rule 133 in order
to facilitate (by relief from the registration requirements of the
Securities Act) the obtaining of stockholder votes in connection with
corporate reorganizations involving issuance of securities. 20 The rule
arranged plan or original intent to distribute existed, it is possible that no registra-
tion of the shares will be required.
2 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 368 (a) (1) (A), (C).
23 Under a "B" reorganization, no stockholder votes are required unless, of course,
additional shares must be authorized or unless the acquiring corporation is required
to obtain a vote of its stockholders by reason of rules of the exchange on which its
stock is listed. For example, the rules of the New York Stock Exchange and the
American Stock Exchange require that stockholder approval be obtained by an
acquiring corporation where it must issue a number of new shares equal to 20%
or more of its presently outstanding shares. A stockholder vote of the acquiring
corporation in a "C" reorganization may also be required in certain instances. See
text accompanying note 37 infra.
"The issuance is still a sale for other purposes, such as § 12 (2) dealing with
civil liabilities; thus misrepresentations in proxy material might support an action
for rescission, or damages.
2517 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1964).
2' Rule 133 (a) provides as follows: "For purposes only of section 5 of the act, no
'sale', 'offer, 'offer to sell', or 'offer for sale' shall be deemed to be involved so far
as the stockholders of a corporation are concerned where, pursuant to statutory pro-
visions in the State of incorporation, or -provisions contained in the certificate of
incorporation, there is submitted to the vote of such stockholders a plan or agree-
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is based upon the proposition that the submission of matters to a
vote of the stockholders is not a solicitation of the sale or purchase
of the security, since the decision does not depend upon the volition
of each individual stockholder, but rather upon the volition of the
stockholders taken as a whole. Moreover, such a vote can bind dis-
senting stockholders, subject to their appraisal rights. The rule had
its genesis in Note 5 to Form E-l, the general registration form
for securities during the early years of the Securities Act. The rule
was adopted as such in 1951, was modified in 1954 to conform to
changes in the Internal Revenue Code,2 7 and was extensively over-
hauled in 1959 as a result of SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc.28
and Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd.29 It applies to "A" and "C" re-
organizations under the Internal Revenue Code.30 It should be
noted that the rule could apply to "C" type reorganizations even
where, for some technical reason, the reorganization involved is not
tax-free.3'
Under rule 133, while any ordinary stockholder of the acquired
corporation may, after reorganization, freely dispose of the shares
of the acquiring corporation which he receives, controlling persons
of the acquired corporation, defined as "affiliates" thereof, are not
ment for a statutory merger or consolidation or reclassification of securities, or a
proposal for the transfer of assets of such corporation to another person in considera-
tion of the issuance of securities of such other person or voting stock of a corporation
which is in control as defined in section 368 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, of such other person, under such circumstances that the vote of a required
favorable majority (a) will operate to authorize the proposed transaction so far as
concerns the corporation whose stockholders are voting (except for the taking of
action by the directors of the corporation involved and for compliance with such
statutory provisions as the filing of the plan or agreement with the appropriate
State authority), and (b) will bind all stockholders of such corporation except to
the extent that dissenting stockholders may be entitled, under statutory provisions
or provisions contained in the certificate of incorporation, to receive the appraised
or fair value of their holdings."
27 The stock issued under a "C" reorganization may now consist of stock of a
corporation in control of the acquiring corporation. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §
368 (a) (1) (C).
28 148 F. Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
21 37 S.E.C. 683 (1957).
81The rule also applies to reclassifications of securities and other recapitaliza-
tions of a corporation with which we are not now concerned.
81 A "C" reorganization may lose its tax-free status if substantially all the assets of
the acquired corporation are not acquired, or if any additional property or securities
distributed to shareholders, plus liabilities assumed by the acquiring corporation, ex-
ceed 20% of the value of the assets transferred. Nonetheless, rule 133 applies if
the proposal is submitted to a stockholder vote pursuant to legal requirements and
securities of the acquiring corporation, or voting stock of a corporation controlling
such acquiring corporation, are distributed.
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free to distribute. Such persons are deemed to be underwriters of
any shares which they receive in the reorganization. Thus, unless
they take the shares for investment and hold them for a consider-
able period, such shares will have to be registered prior to redistri-
bution. Rule 133 (d) provides an escape hatch, however, whereby
controlling persons may resell a limited number of shares in un-
solicited brokerage transactions; in the case of an unlisted company,
the limit is one per cent of its outstanding stock of the same class
in any six-month period, while in the case of listed companies, there
may be sold in a six-month period the lesser of one per cent of
such outstanding capitalization or the highest number of shares
traded on all exchanges in any one of the four weeks preceding
the date of the sell order. This section is patterned after rule 15432
which governs unsolicited brokerage transactions.
Although rule 154 is solely for the protection of the broker who
sells stock for a controlling person,33 rule 133 is clearly for the bene-
fit of the controlling person of the acquired corporation. However,
as is the case with rule 154, two caveats are necessary. The first
concerns the concept of "distribution." Even though the rule spells
out the permissible dispositions during any consecutive six-month
period, which do not constitute a distribution, it seems equally clear
that sales up to the maximum permissible limits in succeeding six-
mofnth periods may well constitute a distribution.34 In short, rule
133, like rule 154, is designed to accommodate sporadic sales; utili-
zation of the exemption on a systematic basis every six months
destroys the casual nature of the sales and therefore the exemption.
The second problem revolves around the meaning of the word
"person" contained in rule 133 (d). While the rule permits un-
solicited brokerage transactions within the specified limits by a "per-
son," the word "person" is construed in the plural as well as the
singular;3 5 consequently, sales by certain controlling persons are
lumped together in order to determine whether the permissible
$' 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1964).
83 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4669, Feb. 17, 1964; 1 Loss, SEcURITIEs REGULA-
TIoN .697 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. A controlling person of an acquired
corporation may also be or become a controlling person of the surviving corporation.
When such a person sells in unsolicited brokerage transactions, either rule 154 or rule
133 may be applicable, but the exemptions may not be cumulated.
s' SEC Securities Act Release No. 4669, Feb. 17, 1964.
OrPLI S.E.C. PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS AND IN UNDERWRITINGS 114-
15 (1962).
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limitations have been exceeded. It has always been clear, for ex-
ample, that sales by persons belonging to a single economic unit,
such as the family, should be lumped together. But how should
sales by common affiliates of the acquired corporation be treated?
The Commission has wrestled with this problem for some time, and
in the past it has simply tried to determine what constitutes a "rea-
sonable grouping of people." Very recently, it has indicated that the
word "person," for purposes of rule 154, really means "group of
closely related persons." 36 The constituency of these groups must
still be worked out in each particular case. It may include persons
closely related by kinship where they held executive positions with
the acquired corporation and received shares in a rule 133 transac-
tion. It may include close business associates. On the other hand,
different sets of control groups of the acquired corporation may be
considered separately.
Where a controlling person of an acquired corporation wishes
to make larger dispositions than are permitted by rule 133, it is
possible in certain situations to resell the stock immediately through
an S-14 registration statement,7 which involves use of the so-called
"wrap-around prospectus." In such cases, if the acquiring corpora-
tion is a listed company and if its acquisition of the acquired corpo-
ration was pursuant to or authorized by a vote of the stockholders
of the acquired corporation, then the proxy statement used in con-
nection with the proxy solicitation may be used by the controlling
person as the nucleus of the required prospectus. Where the re-
organization was a statutory merger, a vote of the stockholders of
the acquiring corporation would also have been required. In the
case of an acquisition of assets for stock, however, a vote of the
stockholders of the acquiring corporation would not have been re-
quired except in two instances: (1) where shares to be issued in the
acquisition had to be authorized by its stockholders, and (2) where
the issuance of the shares had to be approved by the stockholders in
accordance with the rules of the exchange upon which the stock of
the acquiring corporation is listed. If registration on Form S-14 is
accomplished, the prospectus must be maintained current for a
period of two years from the effective date of the registration state-
ment, and for as long thereafter as the distribution of shares re-
"0 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4669, Feb. 17, 1964.
'I Unless the secondary offering is underwritten, the stockholder will be subject
to the hazards discussed in the text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
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ceived in the reorganization continues. Such an undertaking in
effect requires the filing of supplemental prospectuses pursuant to
section 10 (a) (3) of the Securities Act.
As is the case with the "B" reorganization, it is customary in
reorganization agreements following the "A" or the "C" route to
include in the covenants of the acquiring corporation an agreement
that the shares will be registered at the request of controlling stock-
holders of the acquired corporation at any time within a specified
period beginning with the date of the acquisition. It is also cus-
tomary for the acquiring corporation to require persons who control
the acquired corporation at the time of the stockholder vote autho-
rizing the reorganization to represent that they are taking the shares
acquired with a view to investment and not for distribution (sub-
ject to any rights under rule 133 (d)), and further, that no distri-
bution of the shares acquired in the reorganization will be made
within a specified period of time, usually two years from the date
of acquisition, without an opinion of counsel to the effect that such
disposition will not be in violation of the Securities Act.
An agreement to register which is coupled with an agreement
to pay the expenses of registration poses "boot" questions which
are similar to those encountered in the "B" reorganization, but
which have a somewhat lesser impact. Contrary to the "B" reorgani-
zation, "boot" may be received in a "C" reorganization provided
that "substantially all" of the corporation's assets are acquired pur-
suant to the plan of reorganization. In a "C" reorganization the
liabilities as well as the assets of an acquired corporation may be
assumed by an acquiring corporation, and such assumption will not
destroy the reorganization. On the other hand, if additional con-
sideration is paid to the shareholders of the acquired corporation,
then such additional consideration, or "boot," plus the liabilities
assumed, cannot exceed twenty per cent of the value of the assets
acquired. Thus, in cases where assumed liabilities exceed twenty
per cent of the value of the assets acquired (which is probably true
in most cases), payment of the registration expenses by the acquir-
ing corporation could vitiate the tax-free character of the transac-
tion. In such cases the same analysis applies as that under a "B"
reorganization. The acquiring corporation will be discharging an
obligation of its own in paying most of the expenses of the registra-
tion. Only those expenses of the affiliates of the acquired corporation
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which are peculiar to them, such as fees of their counsel, should
be borne by them. The better view is that agreements to register
plus payment of the general registration expenses do not constitute
"boot" in the "C" reorganization.
Under an "A" reorganization, or statutory merger, the "boot"
problem does not arise. Any extra consideration received by stock-
holders of the acquired corporation is taxable to the recipients as
either capital gain or ordinary income. However, the receipt of
"boot" does not destroy the basic tax-free nature of the statutory
merger.
DIFFERING POSITIONS OF THE SHAREHOLDER IN A "B"
REORGANIZATION AND A RULE 133 TRANSACTION
From the standpoint of the acquiring corporation, the "A" and
"C" reorganizations constitute the line of least resistance in a cor-
porate acquisition so far as immediate securities problems are con-
cerned. This advantage must be discounted by the necessity of secur-
ing stockholder approvals, providing appraisal rights for dissenters,
and assuming liabilities of the acquired corporation (subject to war-
ranties of the acquired corporation and its shareholders). More-
over, the transaction will generally be more complex than a "B"
reorganization.
Insofar as the controlling stockholder, of the acquired corpora-
tion is concerned, the brokerage transactions exemption contained
in rule 133 should dictate his preference of the merger or asset
acquisition over the "B" reorganization, at least where there is no
immediate prospect of a registered offering of the shares acquired.
Where the acquiring corporation is an unlisted company and the
number of shares acquired in the reorganization is very large, this
advantage may be more illusory than practical in view of the in-
herent difficulties in effecting unsolicited brokerage transactions in
the over-the-counter market. For bne thing, the broker-dealers who
make the market may be unwilling to drop out of the market for
the period of time necessary to effect an unsolicited brokerage sale
for the selling stockholder.38 Further, the market may be thin and
unable to support dispositions of more than a few hundred shares.
Where the acquiring corporation is a large listed company, how-
ever, the mechanics of effecting the brokerage transaction are easy
38A broker-dealer making a principal market, by definition, is engaged in solicita-
tion. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4669, Feb. 17, 1964.
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to accomplish, since such transactions effected in the regular man-
ner will, by definition, fulfill the requirements of rule 133. More-
over, the market will not only be able to absorb sales of the acquired
securities, but the permissible rule 133 sales limits based upon
trading volume will normally be quite high.
It has been suggested that in the case of an acquired corpora-
tion with a small number of shareholders, each owning substantial
amounts of its stock, rule 133 may not be applicable; if that were
the case, the benefits of rule 133 (d) and (e) would not, of course,
be available. This contention is based upon the proposition that
where a few stockholders hold such substantial blocks of stock as to
assure practical consummation of the reorganization, the transac-
tion partakes more of the nature of a negotiated private transaction
than of a transaction submitted to stockholders for corporate ap-
proval. This position can only be understood in light of certain
cases arising during the mid-1950's.89 Prior to those cases, there was
a prevalent misconception that rule 133 not only exempted the trans-
action whereby a reorganization proposal was presented to stockhold-
ers, but also permanently exempted from registration the shares
issuing out of the reorganization, regardless of the circumstances of
their disposition.40 Promoters, in order to evade registration require-
ments, would either organize a new corporation or acquire an old
shell corporation for the purpose of purchasing the assets of another
corporation in exchange for shares of the new or shell corporation.
These shares would then be publicly marketed, supposedly exempt
from registration. Such transactions were characterized not only by
lack of registration of the securities, but also by fraud and mis-
representation in connection with the subsequent distribution. Even
with rule 133 in its relatively primitive state, the Commissibn had
ample weapons in its arsenal to deal with such situations. For ex-
ample, with regard to the abuses described above, the controlling
persons of the acquired corporation would be regarded as under-
writers in the transaction. Thus, subsequent distributions of shares
by them pursuant to the plan would be subject to registration.
Moreover, such persons would in most cases be controlling persons
of the acquiring corporation and, accordingly, would be required
89 Cases cited notes 28-29 supra.
"It was recognized, of course, that a preconceived plan to acquire a shell corpora-
tion for the purpose of reorganizing with another would constitute the promoters
of the shell corporation underwriters.
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to register the shares upon their disposition. Rather than confining
its retaliation to these grounds, however, the Commission, in the
leading case of Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd.,4 1 went on to state, by
way of dictum, that:
In any event, where the persons negotiating an exchange, merger
or similar transaction have sufficient control of the voting stock
to make a vote of stockholders a mere formality, Rule 133 does
not apply.42
This statement and others like it have caused much subsequent
confusion, if not mischief. For example, assume that two-thirds or
more of the stock of an acquired corporation is owned by one or
two stockholders and the remainder by a relatively small number
of other shareholders. In such a case there should be no question
but that the transaction is covered by rule 133, even though corpo-
rate approval is a foregone conclusion. Another case in which con-
fusion has been created by the Commission's statements is that of
the acquired corporation with a half dozen or so shareholders, each
owning an equal amount of stock. Is an exchange involving this
type of corporation to be considered a "negotiated" transaction as
opposed to one consummated as a result of corporate approval?
The present version of rule 133 is designed to cover affiliates of
the acquired corporation who take other than with a view toward
investment. By virtue of their classification as statutory under-
writers,43 such persons are normally unable to dispose of the shares
received without registration. Likewise, any person taking from such
a stockholder immediately after the reorganization with a view to
distribution becomes an underwriter.44 While the "negotiated sale"
doctrine may still in rare cases be regarded as an implied exception
to the applicability of rule 133, it can be stated that because of
the amendment of that rule in 1959 placing restrictions on affiliates,
the Commission should be less concerned about applying the doc-
trine, since the amendment clearly has precluded the abuses former-
ly feared by the Commission. 45
If the foregoing view is correct, there are marked substantive
,1 37 S.E.C. 683 (1957).
"Id. at 691.
"SEC Rule 133(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (c) (1964).
"SEC Rule 133(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230-133(b) (1964).
"r See PLI, S.E.C. PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS AND IN UNDERWRrIINGS
125-26 (1962); see also 1 Loss 529-39.
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differences between the various modes of reorganization from the
standpoint of the stockholder of the acquired corporation, even when
that corporation is closely-held. The "A" and "C" reorganizations
may permit a relatively easy disposal of some of the shares obtained.
The "B" reorganization, on the other hand, offers the prospect of
having to hold such shares for whatever period of time may be
deemed necessary to demonstrate bona fide investment intent.
CONCLUSION
The federal securities laws leave the stockholder of an acquired
corporation in an unenviable position. He is uncertain in many in-
stances of his legal status and the measures which he must take in
order to protect himself. He may be unable, because of a weak
bargaining position, to exact from the acquiring corporation the
agreements necessary to protect his legitimate interests. Even where
compliance with registration requirements is undertaken by the is-
suer, the stockholder of the acquired corporation is forced to sell
his shares at a time when he may not wish to do so. Registration
for gradual disposition as the stockholder pleases, even when tech-
nically available, is practically and legally difficult, particularly when
the dispositions are to be effected in the over-the-counter market.
It is open to argument whether Congress intended this result.40
At the least, the requirement that shares received in corporate re-
organizations be registered prior to their resale takes no cognizance
of the wide public dissemination of financial information on listed
and unlisted companies effected by the Exchange Act. The Com-
mission constantly cites the "public interest" as justifying ever in-
creasing controls over the securities industry and the distribution
and trading of securities. The number of stockholders of acquired
corporations has increased markedly in recent years (as corporate
acquisitions become the conventional method of corporate expan-
sion), and there may be emerging a second, not necessarily conflict-
ing, public interest to which Congress should direct its attention.
46 Dean, Twenty-Five Years of Federal Securities Regulation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 59 COLUM. L. Rzv. 697, 727 (1959).
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